By: Ambar Zobairi

Sixty years ago, the Voting Rights Act (VRA) broke Jim Crow’s back at the ballot box. Within months of its passage, a quarter-million Black Americans were newly registered to vote. Within a few years, the first Black mayors of major American cities had been elected, and the first Black woman had been sent to Congress. The VRA ended up impacting not only who could vote but also who was elected.

On April 29, 2026, the Supreme Court dealt a major blow to what remained of it.

The 6-3 court ruling in Callais v. Landry is the culmination of a decade-long effort to dismantle the architecture of minority political representation, and its effects are reshaping the 2026 midterm elections in real time. Come November 2026, the United States may see the most consequential shift of American representation since the 1960s.

What is the Voting Rights Act?

On February 3, 1870, the 15th Amendment was ratified by 29 out of 37 states to become part of the U.S. Constitution. The amendment prohibited the federal government and states from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen’s “race, color, or previous condition of servitude”. Yet, for the next 90 years, that promise remained largely unfulfilled. Across the South and beyond, African Americans were subjected to a litany of tactics such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and violence that effectively nullified their political power in practice.

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in August 1965. It was designed to enforce the 15th amendment and dismantle the Jim Crow-era barriers that prevented African-Americans from voting. Its effects were almost immediate. By the end of that year alone, a quarter of a million new black voters registered to vote. The next few years also saw other momentous firsts for the African American community: the first black mayors elected in big cities, the first black senator elected since Reconstruction, and the first black woman, Shirley Chisholm, elected to Congress and running for president.

For decades, the law stood on two primary pillars:

· Section 2 applied nationwide and prohibited any voting practice that resulted in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote based on race.

· Section 5 required states with a history of discrimination to receive preclearance from the federal government before changing any voting laws.

Crucially, Section 2 operated under a results test. This meant that an electoral map or law could be challenged successfully even without proving that lawmakers intended to discriminate. If the actual effect of a map was to dilute the influence of minority voters through “cracking” (splitting a community into several districts so they have no influence) or “packing” (concentrating them into one district to minimize their influence in surrounding districts), the law provided a remedy.

Historically, Section 2 doctrine relied on the three-part Gingles test to require majority-minority districts where a minority community could show it was large, compact, politically cohesive, and consistently defeated by bloc voting. A majority-minority district is one where a racial or language minority group makes up more than 50 percent of the population, theoretically guaranteeing them the opportunity to elect their candidate of choice. This provided a stable, predictable framework for ensuring representation and has resulted in 148 majority-minority districts, accounting for roughly one-third of the House. While often associated with the Black community, majority-minority districts have been essential for increasing representation of a wide variety of communities across the country including:

• Hispanic/Latinos: This is actually the largest community of majority-minority districts, including deep-rooted areas like Texas’s 16th District (El Paso) and Arizona’s 3rd District (Phoenix).

• Asian-Americans: Specific districts have emerged to reflect demographic shifts in urban hubs, most notably California’s 17th District in Silicon Valley, which is 58% Asian, and newer districts in Queens, New York.

• Native Americans: The VRA has protected tribal voices by preventing reservations from being split across multiple districts. In Arizona and New Mexico, for example, Section 2 has been used to ensure the Navajo Nation remains a unified “community of interest,” allowing them to elect representatives who understand their unique sovereign status and infrastructure needs.

The VRA’s Long Decline

Over more than a decade, the Supreme Court has issued a series of decisions that have steadily narrowed the VRA’s reach. The first major blow came in 2013 with Shelby County v. Holder which effectively neutralized Section 5 by striking down the pre-clearance formula used to determine which states required federal oversight for voting law changes. This shifted the entire burden of enforcement to Section 2.

In 2021, the Court’s decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee limited Section 2 by making it harder to challenge voting rules that have a disparate impact on minority groups. More recently, in the 2024 case Alexander v. South Carolina NAACP, the Court established that when race and partisan affiliation are highly correlated, it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to prove racial gerrymandering without extraordinarily powerful evidence.

What is Callais v. Landry?

The legal standard reached a definitive turning point on April 29, 2026, with the Supreme Court’s 6-3 ruling in Callais v. Landry. The case involved Louisiana’s congressional map, which had been redrawn to include a second majority-Black district following the Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling in Allen v. Milligan (which actually focused on Alabama).

In Milligan, the Supreme Court upheld the Section 2 challenge and reaffirmed that if a map results in the dilution of minority voting power, it must be redrawn even if that requires a race-conscious remedy. This ruling sent a clear signal to other states with similar demographics, including Louisiana, that they were legally obligated to draw more representative maps. Following this mandate, Louisiana redrew its congressional boundaries to include a second majority-Black district.

However, in Callais, the Court pivoted. It ruled that Louisiana’s attempt to comply with the VRA was actually an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The Court held that unless there is proof of contemporary, intentional discrimination, the VRA does not provide a “compelling interest” to use race as a factor in redistricting. By shifting the focus from the results of a map to the intent of the mapmakers, the Court effectively ended the era of race-conscious redistricting as a standard practice.

The practical consequences of such a decision are easy to understate. When a majority-minority district is dismantled, the community it represented loses not only a seat but also a representative with a direct stake in its neighborhoods, its schools, and its funding priorities. Candidates who reflect the demographics of a community are less likely to appear on the ballot. Localized concerns get absorbed into larger districts and may not get the attention they need. And the community’s ability to build political leverage over time, including earmarks and sustained legislative attention, evaporates.

The Constitutional Collision

The legal consensus has moved decisively toward a colorblind interpretation of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. For decades, the VRA (grounded in the 15th Amendment) required states to consider race to ensure minority representation. However, the Callais ruling flipped the hierarchy: the Supreme Court now holds that the Equal Protection Clause actually prohibits the government from using race as the “predominant factor” in drawing lines, even when a state says it is trying to comply with the VRA.

Proponents argue this shift ensures that redistricting remains a purely political process, free from racial engineering. Critics, however, contend that by removing these guardrails, the Court is allowing for the systematic dilution of minority voices under the guise of race-neutrality. A number of states are already testing this boundary, creating a landscape of cartographic chaos even as many voters head to the polls for their states’ primaries.

Callais Causes Chaos in the 2026 Primaries

The most striking aspect of the Callais decision is its immediate and disruptive effect on the current 2026 primary cycle. Following the April 29 ruling, Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry issued an emergency declaration to suspend the state’s primary elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, which were scheduled for May 16. This suspension occurred while the election was already in progress; absentee ballots had been mailed, and approximately 42,000 voters had already cast their votes. Early voting started two days later.

Crucially, while the Louisiana House races are suspended to allow for a legislative map redraw, all other contests, including the U.S. Senate primary and local judicial races, are proceeding. House candidates will still appear on the physical ballots, but any votes cast in those specific races will not be counted or certified. This immediately triggered a wave of litigation. On May 4, a coalition including the American Civil Liberties Union and the League of Women Voters filed an emergency federal challenge, Bernard v. Landry. The plaintiffs argue that suspending only a portion of an ongoing election creates confusion and public mistrust and disenfranchises voters who may not realize their House votes are void. As of writing, the standoff remains unresolved, leaving election workers to manage a primary where only some of the ballot actually counts.

Beyond Louisiana, the Callais ruling has acted as a trigger for rapid-response redistricting across the South:

• Florida: The strategic fallout from the Callais decision was felt immediately in Florida, where Governor DeSantis signed a new congressional map on May 4, 2026, timing a special legislative session specifically to capitalize on the Supreme Court’s shift toward race-neutral redistricting. By leveraging this new colorblind standard to dismantle several of the state’s established majority-minority districts in urban hubs like Orlando and Miami, the redraw is projected to shift the state’s delegation from a 20-8 split to a 24-4 Republican supermajority.

• Alabama: On May 8, Governor Kay Ivey signed a legislative package, approved by in a special session triggered by the Callais ruling, that seeks to dismantle the state’s second majority-Black district. Absentee voting for the May 19 primary is already underway. However, the new law authorizes the state to nullify votes already cast for House or Senate seats in affected districts and hold a supplemental primary under a previously rejected, race-neutral map. The Supreme Court cleared the way for the redistricting action on May 11 by sending litigation related to the maps back to the lower courts to consider in light of Callais, over the mandate received just three years ago in Allen v. Milligan.

• Tennessee and South Carolina: On May 6 and 7, both states took aggressive steps toward mid-cycle congressional redraws. In Tennessee, the legislature moved to “crack” the majority-Black city of Memphis into three separate Republican-leaning districts, a move intended to eliminate the state’s final Democratic-held seat. Meanwhile, South Carolina leadership cleared procedural hurdles to target its lone Democratic district, citing the Callais decision as proof that the state is no longer legally required to maintain a majority-minority seat.

• Mississippi: Mississippi is taking a slightly different approach and applying the Callais colorblind standard to its third branch of government. On May 1, Governor Tate Reeves called for a special session in late May specifically to redraw State Supreme Court districts. The state argues that under the new Supreme Court precedent, it is not constitutionally required to create a majority-Black judicial district despite a lower court recently finding that the state’s current judicial maps illegally dilute the power of Black voters, who make up nearly 40 percent of the population.

Impact on the House Balance of Power

Beyond the immediate administrative confusion, the Callais decision has fundamentally altered the math for the 2026 midterm elections. In a closely divided U.S. House of Representatives, where the majority is currently decided by a handful of seats, the sudden ability to redraw maps mid-cycle has turned what were considered safe districts into battlegrounds overnight.

The Republican Strategic Advantage

Legal analysts and political scientists suggest that the weakening of Section 2 provides a distinct strategic advantage to the GOP in the short term. Because Black and Latino voters in the South historically lean Democratic, the majority-minority districts protected by the VRA have served as reliable blue anchors in otherwise red states. Of the 148 majority-minority districts noted earlier, approximately 122 are represented by Democrats and 26 by Republicans. The Callais ruling allows Republican-led legislatures to dismantle these anchors under the guise of partisan gerrymandering, which the Court has ruled is a political question beyond the reach of federal judges. Projections from non-partisan analysts suggest that 15 or more congressional seats in historically black districts could be redrawn to favor Republicans before November, potentially enough to secure the House majority regardless of the national popular vote. This does not even include the number of seats that other communities like Hispanics and Native Americans could lose, nor does it include the number of seats that could be lost in state legislatures.

The Packing Paradox

The Republican map-making surge does carry a structural risk for Republicans. Some scholars have argued that the VRA paradoxically benefited Republicans by concentrating Democratic voters into a handful of majority-minority districts, leaving the surrounding suburban seats safer for GOP incumbents. Unpacking those voters and spreading them across neighboring districts to eliminate majority-minority seats may inadvertently flip those surrounding seats from reliably red to genuinely competitive. In a strong Democratic year nationally, GOP incumbents who once held comfortable margins could suddenly find themselves in purple districts with no cushion.

The Road Beyond Callais

The Callais decision is not the end of the story. Litigation is already moving through the courts, although the legislative redraws are moving faster. Republican-led legislatures across the South have acted with a speed that suggests they anticipated this moment, and the window for any court to intervene before November is narrowing by the week. In the meantime, voters in affected states are already facing confusion around the primaries and whether their votes will count at all. Election staff are bracing for multiple rounds of primaries, adding to their work in an already busy election year. States (and their voters) are bearing costs of administering extra sets of elections that nobody budgeted for.

Those consequences of what is happening now could last for decades to come. The Voting Rights Act was enacted precisely because the right to vote was never enough on its own. The VRA was designed to protect meaningful access to the ballot, and Section 2 ensured that minority communities could translate that access into actual representation. That is what is now being dismantled, one map at a time.

The fight for meaningful representation must now pivot from reactive litigation to proactive, structural reform. The task ahead is not merely to mourn the architecture of the past, but to build a new, fairer foundation for the future of American representation that cannot be gerrymandered. Rebuilding a resilient electoral democracy requires a multi-pronged strategy focused on federal legislation, institutional overhauls, and local civic defenses.

1. Federal Legislative Remedies: Statutory Firewalls

Because the Supreme Court based its Callais ruling on a strict interpretation of current statutes and the 14th Amendment, the most direct remedy lies with Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate federal elections.

• Pass the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act: This legislation would explicitly restore and modernize the VRA and legally reaffirm that any map diluting minority voices is unlawful, regardless of the lawmakers’ stated motives.

• Establish a Federal Ban on Partisan Gerrymandering: Since the Court allows states to use “partisan advantage” as a legal shield to dismantle majority-minority districts, a federal statutory ban on partisan gerrymandering would eliminate this loophole entirely.

2. Structural Reform: Independent Redistricting Commissions (IRCs)

As long as politicians are permitted to draw their own district lines, maps will be weaponized for partisan survival. Moving redistricting out of partisan state legislatures is a proven mechanism for protecting communities of interest.

• Champion Citizen-Led Ballot Initiatives: In states that allow public referendums, citizens can bypass state legislatures to establish independent, non-partisan redistricting commissions.

• Incentivize IRCs Nationally: Advocates must push for federal legislation, such as the Freedom to Vote Act, which mandates the use of independent commissions for all congressional redistricting nationwide.

3. Direct Citizen Action and Civic Oversight

Ultimately, institutional guardrails are only as strong as the civic pressure maintaining them, and there is a part for citizens and civil society to play.

• Demand Accountability from Capitol Hill: Citizens must aggressively engage their federal representatives, demanding co-sponsorship of voting rights legislation and floor votes that force lawmakers to clearly state their positions on representation on the record.

• Invest in Local Election Administration: Because mid-cycle redraws create immense administrative confusion, supporting local election workers, volunteering as non-partisan poll watchers or election workers, and participating in localized voter-education campaigns are critical to ensuring that voters are not disenfranchised by changing poll locations or altered primary dates.

Last month, liberal communities, especially those in oppressed authoritarian states, were looking at post-elections Hungary with hope and the much-needed reassurance that they, too, will soon see similar outcomes from their push-back, non-cooperation, mobilizing, protesting and any work they did on resisting democratic backslide into right-wing nationalism and authoritarianism.

Liberal Democracy Strikes Back

Hungary’s success suggests there might be a pathway for democratic forces facing pressure worldwide to win through elections. Elections are not always an option, however, and not always a secure way to remove tyrants from power. And experience tells us that even when autocrats are ousted at the ballot box, the alternative voters faced are often the least bad alternative. Hungary was certainly no exception, especially if you were a progressive, EU-supporting liberal. Many voters settled for Magyar and his Tisza party simply because there was no winnable alternative from the left. They, and all of us, are hoping Magyar will now deliver on his promises, otherwise it would be a bitter triumph.

The relief felt by liberal democratic communities abroad was not sparked by enthusiasm for Magyar, as much as it was because even with all the money, media, high-level endorsements, and close collaboration with Washington and Moscow, the Hungarian voters were still able to oust Orbán, the longest-serving EU head of state, and self-styled builder of an “illiberal state.”

Whether Orbán pioneered this model, or borrowed a thing or two from others, we know from Anne Applebaum’s research, that authoritarians do not operate in a vacuum. Historians can tell us later whether Orbán learned and adapted the models of his neighboring radical in Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, the Turkish President Erdogan, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, or the former Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, who was smuggled into Hungary overnight (where he still enjoys refuge and evades justice in his home country). More likely, each reinforced the other, by probing and taking things a step further along the illiberal, authoritarian path.

We also know that competitive (or electoral) autocracies do not start spectacularly. Like any other form of government, they start at the ballot box. As Orbán repeated before he came back to power, all Fidesz needed was to win once, but win big, meaning a win by a big enough majority so he could change the rules. Which is exactly what he did when he and Fidesz swept into power in 2010. He started with the Constitution, the electoral and court systems, then took control of 80% of the media. Spreading fear, labeling enemies, stoking polarization and division, all became cornerstones to his illiberal democracy. Like other nationalist and fascist regimes, Orbán and Fidesz trumpeted national pride and supremacy, while they discriminated against minority groups and instilled fear of diversity.

Another essential trait they shared with other autocracies is that they treated the state apparatus and its budget as their private, uncontested property. To be more precise, competitive autocracies consider the national budget a commercial platform for amassing wealth, and project power by trading seats at the deal-making table for lucrative personal bribery. All of this is accompanied by a failure to deliver on what got them into power in the first place–promises of basic good governance, economic turnarounds, and providing services to all citizens.

Lessons for Democracy Renewal

Hungary is as much a story about the illiberal playbook as it is a story about how to disrupt authoritarian regimes. So let’s extract a few transferable takeaways from the Hungarian election, as they can offer lessons for proponents of liberal democracy in the US and abroad.

1. The captured-state model is not inevitable. To the contrary, Orbán’s electoral defeat in a landslide is evidence that the model is far from permanent, and not nearly as popular as its architects claim. In fact, Hungarian voters called on their historical memory of overcoming earlier periods of oppression, with Magyar associating his party’s victory with Hungary’s 1848 revolution and the 1956 uprising against Soviet occupation.

2. The opposition unified around a leader, and a vision for the future. Hungarian analysts reported that the opposition parties across the political spectrum read the room, and as Magyar built momentum, they were persuaded to withdraw in order to avoid splitting the anti-Fidesz vote. Factionalism was suspended both by politicians and by voters. Magyar was far from an ideal choice for the left, but they united over a few critical issues, like removing Orbán from power, investigating corruption, and retrieving stolen assets.

3. Magyar himself directly campaigned throughout the country, including in rural Fidesz strongholds. He kept the argument exactly where Hungarian voters’ frustration lived–in their daily lives and aspirations. By focusing on bread and butter issues, he avoided being dragged into the narrative traps Orbán set for him.

4. Liberal allies in the region and in Brussels joined the effort. Anti-Fidesz CSOs and a handful of media critics of Orbán government and their representatives frequently participated in international discussions on democracy, media freedom, and rule-of-law concerns in Hungary. Other countries in the region, notably the Czech Republic and Poland, increased their criticism of Orbán, especially over the Ukraine war.

5. Independent investigative media worked around the clock to drive anti-Fidesz coverage. As the journalists broke scandal after scandal, Magyar incorporated their reporting into his campaign as he visited 700 towns and villages over two years. His audiences had seldom heard more than Fidesz-curated messaging on their local news. Aware of how the media space and the algorithms had been manipulated, Magyar he used investigative reporting to charge his analog campaigning, and used his megaphone to amplify the findings. Local organizers used social media, mainly Facebook, to connect people across the country and build community.

6. The propaganda machine could not overcome poor governance. The authoritarians’ bully pulpit and illiberal network of think tanks and narrative creators, which had driven the narrative and instilled fear in the voters, died out when political power and resources dried up. No propaganda matrix could paper over the poor performance and rampant corruption that exploited, rather than served the people.

7. Youth played a pivotal role. An entire generation who had only experienced life under Orbán’s rule threatened to leave the country if he won another term. Following an increasingly familiar pattern in authoritarian contexts around the world, Gen Z rejected an authority built on fear and performative leadership, and from which they were fundamentally excluded. Young voters proved themselves fully engaged, ready to put their faith in leaders who inspire, rather than intimidate them.

From Hungary with Love

Though Hungary’s experience offers a number of lessons, those looking for simple formulas or one-size-fits-all strategies will be disappointed. Political systems, histories, and cultures differ, and the United States is not Hungary. Still, the Hungarian experience offers a useful set of observations for those working to build an agenda for democratic renewal. Here are a few suggestions I imagine a Hungarian activist might write on a postcard—“From Hungary, with love”—to democracy renewal actors in the United States.

1. Failing to resist authoritarianism would be a defeat in itself–there is no excuse for inaction.

The US has been a driving force and a beacon of democracy in the post-WWII world. To all of those who have been working on good governance and democracy internationally, and have celebrated incremental success elsewhere, democratic backsliding in the epicenter of liberal democracy is surreal. To all those who have invested in American and global democracy failing to resist authoritarianism would be a demoralizing defeat. That’s why democracy defenders need to keep up the pressure to disrupt the authoritarian playbook. In the absence of such pressure the risks of an indefinite autocracy in the US, like the one that made Orbán the longest-serving EU Head of State, is too great to tolerate.

2. Build an Alliance for America!

No opposition group by itself can win the next election. One important takeaway from Hungary’s experience is that increasing voter turnout is critical, so engaging the grassroots initiatives, and uniting those opposed to authoritarianism under one umbrella must be a deliberative process that will crystallize a vision that a new coalition can get behind. This type of “Alliance for America” can appeal to disillusioned voters, frustrated conservatives, everyone opposed to new wars, the entire spectrum of voices on the left, independents, unions, youth, religious communities, and everyone else who opposes this system.

3. Empires crumble from within–which is where you need to meet people.

As regimes spread geographically, often in pursuit of imperialist aims, the core back home feels the brunt of the failure of governance. Preaching to the converted is not enough. Outreach to their core voters in the heartland, is exactly what changed the mood in Hungary. Across rural Hungary—the source of Orbán’s base—small civic groups, called Tisza Islands, formed in places where Fidesz had closed off civil society. Though these groups shared the name of Magyar’s party, they functioned independently, and were able to organize and build community outside of party politics.

Discussing why democracy matters, how authoritarianism erodes liberty, what that struggle looks like, where it is unfolding, how difficult it is to rebuild the structures once they have been weakened are all important questions for awareness-raising and community-building. But the reality is that most people have neither the time nor motivation to engage in such abstract terms. Instead, people are mobilized by building a sense that they have the power to remove elected officials who are responsible for economic hardship, the loss of jobs, social deterioration, poor education, unaffordable healthcare, rising costs, corruption, evasion of justice, mistreatment of their neighbors or coworkers, or starting wars of choice that risk American lives and overburden taxpayers.

The job of pro-democracy movements is not only to defend the principles of democracy, but to understand the day-to-day needs of their communities, and communicate how the erosion of democracy impacts their lives, and the costs of further degradation. Magyar spoke to those voters and, importantly, he listened to them. The democracy renewal effort needs to reach people where they are, listen, and carry those voices to the ballot box.

4. Democratic renewal demands accountability.

Following his election, Magyar promised that Hungary would no longer harbor wanted criminals, referring to Zbigniew Ziobro, the former Polish Minister of Justice, who had fled Poland to take refuge in Hungary. Ziobro was recently smuggled into the US, with Polish media alleging that senior US officials played a role in facilitating his entry despite internal objections. Under Orbán, Hungary faced criticism for harboring figures accused of corruption, abuses of power, and other anti-democratic activities.

Democratic renewal requires accountability. Whether involving domestic actors or individuals accused of crimes abroad, rule of law depends on institutions that investigate wrongdoing fairly, apply legal standards consistently, and ensure political influence does not place powerful actors beyond the reach of justice.

Author, Ida Manton, is a trainer and scholar specializing in international relations, diplomacy, negotiation, and conflict resolution. She has worked with IGOs, NGOs, universities, diplomatic academies, and think tanks, training diplomats, business leaders, military staff, and students across Europe, the U.S., and Central Asia. She has published widely, including co-authoring the 2024 book Ukraine: Putin’s War for Russia’s Near Abroad and contributing to the 2026 Negotiating Identity Conflicts in a Fragmenting World Order.

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